INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a persuasive argument has been made for the use of information criterion (IC) model selection in place of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) based on P values (Johnson 1999 , Burnham and Anderson 2002 , Johnson and Omland 2004 . In this issue, Murtaugh (2014) questions the basis for this argument. We comment on this paper from the perspective of early-career ecologists and present the results of an informal survey of our colleagues on their choice of statistical methods. Specifically, we ask to what extent the IC approach has supplanted traditional hypothesis testing. Finally, we address issues related to the use and interpretation of P values, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and effect sizes in ecological studies.
WHAT ARE P VALUES FOR?
Statistical models often are used in a NHST framework to find the factors ''explaining'' a certain pattern. Increasingly, statistical models also are used in an exploratory analysis or for data mining, in which many predictors are examined without a priori hypotheses, and the ''significant'' results are considered candidates for follow-up study (e.g., genome-wide association studies and climatic effects on species distribution). As practicing ecologists, we use P values or AIC to determine whether a specific factor (e.g., water quality) is an important predictor for an ecological outcome (e.g., fish abundance). P values lead to binary decision making (Fisher 1973 as cited in Murtaugh 2014) . While this yes/no outcome may be desirable for management outcomes, it is exactly what IC approaches try to avoid. While the past 15 years have seen a strong push for the use of AIC in ecological studies to avoid this binary decision making, in practice, threshold values of change in AIC (DAIC) are often used in a similar way as are P values: to assess significance of a predictor. This practice is one of the arguments that Murtaugh (2014) uses to question the criticism of NHST.
Specifically, for nested linear models with Gaussian errors, Murtaugh (2014) demonstrates that P values, confidence intervals, and AIC are mathematically equivalent and therefore provide different approaches to reporting the same statistical information. While the equivalence of P values and confidence intervals is by definition true and should be no surprise to any student of statistics, the relationship between P values and AIC is not as intuitive. The proponents of AIC cited by Murtaugh and others (e.g., Whittingham et al. 2006) have made strong statements regarding null hypothesis testing that appear to be ill founded in light of Murtaugh's results. In particular, demonstrating that the choice of a threshold for DAIC is as arbitrary as a chosen significance (a) level for P values challenges the idea the DAIC is always the preferable method.
In practice, the choice of statistical method is constrained by experimental design. Specifically, as explained by Murtaugh (2014) , null hypothesis testing is appropriate to test ''the effects of treatments in a randomized experiment'' whereas AIC is ''useful in other situations involving the comparison of non-nested statistical models.'' Thus, for designed experiments with few parameters, there is no clear reason to use AIC over NHST, whereas in studies with many parameters and potential interactions, AIC is preferable. Moreover, AIC has the advantage that it can be used for non-nested models. Given that for many studies, using AIC as opposed to P values to select significant predictors is primarily a matter of choice, we were interested in the extent to which ecologists chose AIC or conventional NHST in the analysis of a simple data set.
WHAT METHODS ARE EARLY-CAREER ECOLOGISTS USING?
To evaluate the extent to which the IC approach has supplanted the use of P values, we downloaded a typical observational data set from Ecological Archives (Koenig and Knops 2013) consisting of a single response (acorn count), three designed effects (species, site, and year) and 14 environmental variables, from which we selected a subset of 7 for simplicity. We recruited early-career ecologists, who will have had the most exposure to the AIC literature in their academic training, using personal e-mail, the ecolog list serve, and the early-career ecologists blog (available online). 4, 5 We asked them to ''explain the variation in the response variable (acorn count) using the predictors available'' (full details in Supplement). We received responses from a skilled (average self-reported statistical expertise of 6.7 on scale of 1 [low] to 10 [high]) diverse group of 24 ecologists representing 7 countries. Of these responses, 10 participants used P values, 10 used AIC, and four used alternative (e.g., Bayesian) approaches. Thus, it appears that even among early-career ecologists, there is a lack of clear consensus of which method is more appropriate.
Starting with the same data set, participants came to surprisingly different conclusions. Of the participants who reported some type of model selection, no two final models included exactly the same set of predictors. Moreover, of the 10 potential predictor variables, not a single one was included in every final model (Fig. 1 , lower left panels). While the final models differed in the number of predictors they contained, each term was retained in roughly the same proportion of models selected by P values or AIC. Moreover, most final models had similar predictive power and there was no qualitative improvement in prediction after four parameters were included in the model (Fig. 2) emphasizing the point that ''Regression is for prediction and not explanation.'' We further explored how model selection influenced prediction by dividing the data into trial (70% of observations) and test (30% of observations) data sets. For each of the 20 final models provided by survey participants, we fit linear models on 400 trial data sets and calculated the squared error for each model as the deviation of the predicted values from the observed FIG. 1. Plot used for exploratory data analysis of the example data. The diagonal shows density plots representing the distribution of each variable. The upper right triangle of panels shows bivariate scatterplots of all variables, with a lowess smooth function. The lower left triangle of panels is a summary of the final models from the survey participants, with the number of models out of 20 that included each variable (rows) under the first column (acorn count) and the number of time each combination of variables occurred on the off-diagonals. The order of the rows and columns is acorn count (number per 30 seconds of counting, logtransformed); mean maximum (max) April temp; mean max March temp; March rain; April rain; March rain lagged 1 yr; April rain lagged 1 year; mean max summer temp. Full description of the variables is available in Koenig and Knops (2013). values in the test data set (Fig. 3) . Additionally, we created models by randomly picking one to all of the variables and testing their predictive ability (Fig. 3 , grayshaded region and black line). We found that model selection improves prediction when few parameters are included in the model, but with four or more parameters there is no difference between randomly selecting parameters and using model selection ( Fig. 3 ; point estimates for selected models fall along the line for randomly selected models). Moreover, there was no clear difference in predictive ability among models selected by AIC (solid circles) or P values (open squares), though models selected by AIC tended to include fewer parameters.
This variation in results was surprising, given that all participants used the same general approach. The majority, 88%, of participants performed exploratory analysis, typically graphical exploration of correlations among the environmental variables (Fig. 1, upper right  panels) . In many cases, they often selected a single one of the highly correlated variables (e.g., r ¼ 0.78 between mean maximum March and mean maximum April temperatures) to include in the models. Thus, the choice of which variables to include as predictors in the model is one explanation for why the final models differed among responses. Subsequently, participants fit a wide range of statistical models, with 96% using R (R Development Core Team 2013), as we encouraged in our initial request to facilitate reproducibility of the analysis. The methods used included standard multiple linear regression (lm), mixed-effects models (lme), generalized linear mixed models (glmer), autoregressive-moving-average (gls), boosted regression trees (gbm), and Bayesian methods (JAGS). In addition, three participants suggested using cross-validation methods. From this anecdotal sample, it is clear that there is little consensus about the standard accepted practice for ecological data analysis. Consequently, ecologists tend to use the methods with which they are most familiar. This lack of standardization in the statistical methods led to a range of conclusions about the importance of individual predictors from a single data set.
Given our instructions, our preferred analysis to explain variation in acorn production was a mixedeffects model with site and year as random effects and the remaining terms as fixed. After stepwise model selection, three terms were retained at P , 0.05, but two of these were marginally significant (P ¼ 0.049) and would be removed after correcting for multiple testing (P , 0.05/7 ¼ 0.007). In contrast, DAIC retained only the single highly significant predictor. Alternatively, to focus on interannual variation in acorn production, a time-series analysis could be performed (Fig. 2) . Using either NHST or AIC, this approach retained more terms in the final model (four and five terms, respectively), including the one term (April rain lagged 1 year) retained by both NHST and AIC in the mixed-effects analysis. The two terms marginally significant (P ¼ 0.049) by NHST in the mixed-effects analysis were both significant when performed as a time-series analysis, indicating that this method is more powerful for detecting significant environmental effects. 
P VALUES, EFFECT SIZE, AND ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE
Murtaugh (2014) touches on three points that warrant further consideration. First, statistical tests using small sample sizes often lack power to reject the null hypothesis, even when the differences among means are large (Murtaugh 2014: Eq. 3) . Without explicit consideration of the false negative rate, ecologists may fail to reject a false null hypothesis (a Type II or ''consumer'' error) when, in fact, they lack sufficient power to reject it. Arguably, the consequences of a consumer error are greater than rejecting a true null hypothesis (e.g., error on the side of caution), yet for small sample sizes typical of ecological studies, the standard a ¼ 0.05 makes a consumer error more likely than falsely rejecting a true null hypothesis (a Type I or ''producer'' error; Fig. 1 in Mudge 2012a). Murtaugh (2014) alludes to methods that allow the relative costs of consumer and producer errors to be made explicit, prior to the analysis (Mapstone 1995 , Mudge 2012a . For example, Mudge et al. (2012b) reanalyze data from the Canadian Environmental Effects Monitoring Program, setting an optimal a that balances the cost of making a producer or consumer error for a given sample size. From this analysis, they found that 8-31% of the tests would have resulted in different management outcomes if an optimal a level (ranging from 6.6 3 10 À5 to 0.309 with median ¼ 0.073) had been used (Mudge et al. 2012b) . Whereas the choice of the critical effect size and optimal consumer vs. producer error cost is somewhat subjective, interpretation of results and management decisions likely will be improved by explicit consideration of these parameters.
Second, Murtaugh (2014) states that ''DAIC-based comparisons of nested models are often much more conservative than conventional hypothesis test done at the 0.05 level . . .'' Our analysis is consistent with this, although we note that after correcting for multiple testing the P value based likelihood ratio test approach gives the same result as using DAIC. One of the challenges of AIC is that ecological studies frequently report only the ''best'' model extracted from automated AIC selection procedures, even though the others are likely to be as good as well (Whittingham et al. 2006 ). Burnham and Anderson (2002) have advocated in favor of reporting multiple models or performing model averaging. Competing with these approaches, a multitude of methods exist for P value correction including sequential Bonferroni (Rice 1989, but see Moran 2003) and false discovery rate (Garcı´a 2004) . With data sets of ever-increasing size being collected, it is becoming more common for the number of variables to exceed the number of observations, and correct application of these methods is imperative to avoid false positive associations.
Finally, ecologists in general pay more attention to the P values than to the parameters of biological interest; the effect sizes. We support the position of Murtaugh (2014) and Nakagawa and Cuthill (2007) that estimated effect sizes should always be published alongside of P values. However, just as P values have limitations, the effect size is itself an estimate that is susceptible to bias. This is explicit in the bias-variance trade-off (Burnham and Anderson 2001:31) where increasing the predictive ability of a model (decreasing bias) increases the variance; model selection optimizes this trade-off. Moreover, due to the ''winner's curse'' (Zollner and Pritchard 2007, Button et al. 2013) , a parameter that is found to be significant, especially in an under-powered study, is quite likely to have an exaggerated estimate of its effect size. This problem (e.g., the ''Beavis effect'' in plant genetics; Beavis 1994 , Xu 2003 plagues the field of mapping phenotype to genotype as the effect size of significant quantitative trait loci (or nucleotides) are overestimated in initial studies and are found to be much smaller upon validation (Larsson et al. 2013) . Thus, reporting effect sizes is imperative, but understanding that effect sizes can be biased is crucial for their interpretation.
FORUM

CONCLUSION
This is not the first time that ecologists are being reminded that there are few laws of statistics. Thirteen years ago, Stewart-Oaten (1995) wrote in Ecology that ''judgments based on opinions become laws of what 'should be done','' which echoes the sentiment of Murtaugh regarding P values and AIC (Murtaugh 2014) . In face of this repeated problem, how are students of ecology supposed to learn the difference between an opinion and a law? Ellison and Dennis (2010) recommend ecologists gain statistical fluency through calculus and statistics. Houle et al. (2011) have argued that there is ''. . . a systemic lack of respect for measurement and models in biology'' and similarly calls for increased awareness of and education in quantitative skills. All ecologists may not be able to take courses in statistical theory, but there are ample opportunities for selfteaching of statistics in the practice of research (Ellison and Dennis 2010) .
One suggestion that we have is that ecologists should more fully embrace the spirit of reproducible research (Gentleman and Lang 2004, Ellison 2010) . In addition to archiving their raw data, which is now required by many journals, authors should make the source code freely available. In fact, this is now required practice at Ecology. R scripts can be archived at Ecological Archives or Dryad with data files, or made available through resources such as GitHub, which has the advantage of allowing for version control and collaboration. If readers are skeptical of the statistical analyses performed by the authors, they will be able to reanalyze the data, applying the methods they find most appropriate.
To conclude, notwithstanding 10 years calling for the abandonment of NHST using P values, we find that early-career ecologists continue to use P values, in addition to a battery of other statistical tools including AIC. We find this encouraging, as it was clear in the responses to our survey that ecologists are actively trying to use the best statistical methods possible in the face of uncertain and contradictory statistical advice. With colleagues such as these, we look forward to more robust and nuanced uses of statistics for addressing the major questions of ecology.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Supplement R script, results and example data set provided to early-career ecologists for a survey of statistical methods used in analysis of an ecological data set (Ecological Archives E095-054-S1). Murtaugh (2014) argues, ''Since P values, confidence intervals, and DAIC are based on the same statistical information, all have their places in modern statistical practice. The choice of which to use should be stylistic . . .'' and ''To say that one of these metrics is always best ignores the complexities of ecological data analysis, as well as the mathematical relationships among the metrics.'' On the whole, I agree. I will use this Comment to discuss some technical issues and to argue that P values, confidence intervals, and change in Akaike's information criterion (DAIC) should be viewed as descriptive statistics, not as formal quantifications of evidence.
Binary declarations of significance
I agree with Murtaugh that ''One resolution of the problem of the arbitrariness of a cut-off . . . is to abandon the idea of the binary decision rule entirely and instead simply report the P value.'' However, most accept/reject declarations have no consequences, so I disagree with calling them decisions. To illustrate, after a medical trial, doctors must decide whether to prescribe a treatment and patients must decide whether to take it. But doctors' and patients' decisions need not agree with each other and need not agree with the original investigators' declaration of significance. It's not the investigators who decide; it's doctors and patients. Their decisions have consequences whose probabilities and utilities should guide the decisions.
Most accept/reject declarations have no consequences, are not guided by the probabilities and utilities of consequences, and cannot be recommended as substitutes for subsequent decisions. Though some authors explain accept/reject declarations in terms of 0-1 utility functions, those functions are chosen for explanatory value, not for realism. Where Murtaugh advises ''instead simply report the P value,'' I argue that the declaration is not a useful entity that needs something else in its stead.
That we can abandon the declaration but still report a P value, confidence interval, or DAIC shows that the arbitrariness of 0.05 is an argument against the declaration, not against the P value, CI, or DAIC. 
